

~~TOP SECRET~~

62398

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900070004-6

Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : Assistant Director for National Estimates

DATE: 29 August 1951

FROM : Assistant to the Director

SUBJECT: Presidential Address Attached

DOCUMENT NO. 4NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐☐ DECLASSIFIEDCLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 2011

NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____

AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE: 23 03 81REVIEWER:

1. The attached standby address has been prepared for Presidential delivery in the event of a breakdown in negotiations at Kaesong.

2. Because it ventures into a discussion of possible or probable Soviet intentions, you might wish to comment on it.

3. We have been asked to make an early return of the draft to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~cc: Signer 2 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900070004-6~~TOP SECRET~~

THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE DECLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED.

25X1

25X1

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

30 August 1951

53615-
Cy 1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Comments on Draft Standby Address for Presidential Delivery in the Event of a Breakdown in Negotiations at Kaesong

REFERENCE: Memorandum of Assistant to the Director, 29 August 1951.

1. The draft assumes that the Communists will so act that it will be plain to all that they have broken off the negotiations, but that there will not have been a new offensive. We believe any such clear-cut break-off action is unlikely. In the recent bombing incident, the Communists, clumsy as they were in fabricating the incident, were clever in avoiding the onus of a definitive break. The USSR has generally been extremely careful to avoid the appearance of breaking off negotiations, and the Chinese Communists during the civil war generally renewed hostilities not after any definite break but while talks were still going on or when they had been tacitly allowed to drop. In our view the two most likely contingencies are:

(a) That the Communists will allow the talks to fade away, perhaps to the point where no further meetings are scheduled, but without a formal break-off. In this case, a Presidential speech throwing the blame on the Communists or warning them against starting a new offensive would presumably be more guarded than the present draft.

(b) That the Communists will launch a major offensive, claiming that the US/UN disrupted the negotiations and possibly employing other arguments connected with the Japanese Peace Treaty. In this case, a Presidential speech would necessarily deal with the actuality of renewed aggression rather than merely with the threat.

2. The second half of the draft (from the 2nd paragraph of page 7 on) deals with the risk of war with the USSR in highly generalized terms, including reference to present US policies but also carrying a strong hint of unspecified US offensive action (e.g., the 2nd paragraph of page 12 and the closing sentence of the draft). We suggest that initially emphasis be given to the UN determination to reach its objectives in Korea by whatever means are required, including the military moves already covered in pages 9-11 of the draft. Instead of stressing the possibility that Communist China might engage in aggressions elsewhere in Asia (which is not regarded as likely in US intelligence estimates), it would be better to emphasize

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

that the probable intensification of the war in Korea is likely to lead to full-scale war between the UN/US and Communist China. Thereafter, the responsibility of the USSR and the risk of general war between the US and the USSR could be considered, along with a statement of what the American people must do to meet this situation.

3. It is noted that no part of the draft is addressed directly to the fighting men in Korea. Explanation of the situation to these men appears vital.

4. On pages 5 and 6, reference is made to production of "heavy weapons, ammunition, or airplanes" in Communist China. Since Communist China does produce some ammunition, it is suggested that this read: "heavy weapons, artillery, tanks, or planes." (Note that there are two references.)

5. On page 7, reference is made to Communist capabilities:

(a) If reference is made to possible further Communist aggression in Asia (see comment 2 above), from an intelligence standpoint an early attack on India appears unlikely, though it may be desirable for policy reasons to refer to such an attack as an eventual possibility. We suggest the wording: ". . . against Indo-China, Burma, and the rest of Southeast Asia."

(b) The possibility of attack in Western Europe might be emphasized more, together with an explicit statement that the Soviet Union is in a state of war-readiness both in Europe and in the Far East.

6. From the intelligence standpoint, it seems unwise at this time, when the emphasis should be on resistance to aggression, to suggest that the real American objective is the reduction of the Soviet orbit (pages 12 and 13).

25X1

WILLIAM L. LANGER
Assistant Director
National Estimates

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

REGISTRY

25X1 SOURCE:
 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 29 Aug 51
 COPY NUMBER (S): Orig
 NUMBER OF PAGES: 1 DOCUMENT NO. Memo
 NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS: lcc 62395 w/1 TS DRAFT

CIA CONTROL NUMBER: 62398
 DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED: 29 Aug 51
 LOGGED BY: mas

ATTENTION: THIS FORM WILL BE ATTACHED TO EACH TOP SECRET DOCUMENT RECEIVED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OR CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET WITHIN THE CIA AND WILL REMAIN ATTACHED TO THE DOCUMENT UNTIL SUCH TIME AS IT IS DOWNGRADED, DESTROYED OR TRANSMITTED OUTSIDE OF CIA. ACCESS TO TOP SECRET MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE OFFICIAL DUTIES RELATE TO THE MATERIAL. EACH ALTERNATE OR ASSISTANT TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER WHO RECEIVES AND/OR RELEASES THE ATTACHED TOP SECRET MATERIAL WILL SIGN THIS FORM AND INDICATE PERIOD OF CUSTODY IN THE LEFT-HAND COLUMNS PROVIDED. THE NAME OF EACH INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS SEEN THE TOP SECRET DOCUMENT AND THE DATE OF HANDLING SHOULD BE INDICATED IN THE RIGHT-HAND COLUMNS.

25X1 REFERRED TO RECEIVED RELEASED SEEN BY
 OFFICE SIGNATURE DATE TIME DATE TIME NAME & OFFICE SYMBOL DATE

<p>DOCUMENT NO. <u>4</u> NO CHANGE IN CLASS. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S <u>02011</u> NEXT REVIEW DATE: <u>230181</u> AUTH: HR 702 DATE: <u>230181</u> REVIEWER: </p>	<p>JOB NO. <u>8001231-R</u> BOX NO. <u>11</u> FOLDER NO. <u>4</u> TOTAL BOSS HEREIN <u>---</u></p>
--	--

DECLASSIFY WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURES

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT

WHEN THIS FORM IS DETACHED FROM TOP SECRET MATERIAL IT WILL BE COMPLETED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACES BELOW AND TRANSMITTED TO CENTRAL TOP SECRET CONTROL FOR RECORD.

The Top Secret material detached from this form was:

DOWNGRADED

DESTROYED

DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO: _____

BY: _____ (SIGNATURE)

(OFFICE) _____ (DATE) _____

TOP SECRET